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Whole life insurance plays an important role in household saving. However, empirical 
evidence on its determinants is scarce. This paper studies two natural experiments to identify 
the effects of tax incentives and bequest motives on life-insurance demand. An unanticipated 
tax reform in 2000 halved the tax exemption limit for capital income in Germany. We 
document that the demand for life insurance reacted strongly to this change. With regard to 
bequest motives, we analyze the demand for life insurance in the former German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). Relative to market-based economies, the socialist GDR can be viewed as an 
experimental institutional setting where life-insurance demand was not influenced by tax 
considerations which allows us to isolate bequest motives while controlling for life-cycle and 
precautionary motives. We find a significantly higher ownership probability among 
households with children and a high regard for the family, confirming bequest motives in life-
insurance demand. 
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Life insurance is one of the most popular ¯nancial assets owned by a large number of
households in many countries (Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2002). In its simplest form
{ term life insurance { it enables the policyholder to pass on bequests to children or
other bene¯ciaries if he or she dies before a certain point in time (the end of the term).
However, in many countries, life insurance products are a popular savings vehicle for old
age as well. Under whole life insurance contracts, the insurer faces a certain liability over
the whole lifetime of the insured, for which the insurer accumulates reserves during the
working life of the policyholder. Typically, the policyholder has the right to withdraw the
savings component in old age, provided he or she survives. As a result, under whole life
insurance term life insurance provisions are coupled with a savings contract. This savings
component of whole life insurance often receives tax preferences. Studying the demand
for whole life insurance ownership has signi¯cant appeal as it allows testing for both the
importance of tax incentives and bequest motives in households' savings decisions. This
paper explores these two aspects through a study of whole life insurance ownership in
Germany.
Interest in providing incentives for retirement savings (including through whole life
insurance) intensi¯ed during the past few years. Many governments have already reduced
the generosity of existing pay-as-you-go pension systems, or are considering doing so
as their population ages. Hence, households are increasingly pressed to increase their
private savings portfolio in order to sustain the standards of living during retirement, and
governments seek to encourage these savings through preferential tax rules. The empirical
evidence on the importance of such tax incentives is, however, inconclusive. Scholz (1994)
¯nds little evidence that households modi¯ed their portfolios in response to the 1986
US Tax Reform Act. Also, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2003, 2007) do not ¯nd signi¯cant
changes in the demand for life insurance and mortgage debt by those households most
a®ected by incremental tax reforms in Italy. On the other hand, several studies that
use cross-sectional data report a positive correlation between marginal tax rates and
investments channelled into tax-sheltered assets: Alan et al. (2009) for Canada, Alan and
Leth-Petersen (2006) for Denmark, Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (1997) for the
1Netherlands, Agell and Edlin (1991) for Sweden, Banks and Tanner (2001) for the UK,
and ¯nally King and Leape (1998), Poterba (2002), and Poterba and Samwick (2003) for
the US. Yet in cross-sections, it is di±cult to disentangle genuine variation in marginal
tax rates for given income from genuine variation in income for given tax rates, because
after-tax-yields depend on changing marginal tax rates which in turn depend on income
levels.1
Our analysis contributes to the literature on taxation and portfolio choice by exploit-
ing a natural experiment that induced changes in tax incentives for investing in whole
life insurance. In Germany, a tax reform in 2000 enables us to contrast life-insurance
demand among those households a®ected by the reform with that of a control group that
remained una®ected. The changes in the tax law reduced the limit on tax exemptions
and created a strong incentive among households that were fully exempt from capital
income taxation before the reform to shelter their savings from taxation by investing in
(tax-exempt) life insurance contracts afterwards. In contrast to the prior literature, this
allows us to analyze the impact of changing tax incentives at the margin rather than
relying on incremental changes in after-tax returns.
A second aspect of life-insurance demand studied in this paper relates to the im-
portance of bequest motives for saving decisions. Empirical studies disagree about the
strength of bequest motives. Estimates of the share of bequests in aggregate private
savings range from 17 (Modigliani, 1988) to 46 percent (Kotliko® and Summers, 1981).
Cross-country evidence shows that life-insurance demand is higher in countries with a
high dependency ratio (Browne and Kim, 1993), high income per capita, low in°ation,
and a high degree of banking sector development (Beck and Webb, 2003). At the house-
hold level, Bernheim (1991) ¯nds that a signi¯cant fraction of life-insurance demand and
consumption can be motivated by the desire to leave bequests to one's children. Kopczuk
and Lupton (2007) estimate that households with a bequest motive save about 25 per-
cent more, whereas Hurd (1987, 1989) ¯nds that the marginal utility from bequests in
a consumption-savings model is close to zero. Data from direct survey questions on the
intention to leave a bequest has been used by Laitner and Juster (1995) and JÄ urges (2001).
1 In his seminal contribution, Feldstein (1976) uses labor income as a proxy for the marginal tax rate.
2Although both ¯nd that bequest motives shape savings behavior, altruism toward one's
children appears to be of only minor importance. All these studies su®er from the di±culty
to distinguish true bequest motives from other savings motives, such as tax, life-cycle, or
precautionary motives. In this paper, we can identify the importance of bequest motives
in the demand for life insurance by exploiting the natural experiment of the division of
Germany into two separate states. Owing to the absence of tax incentives and the lim-
ited number of consumption and savings possibilities in the former German Democratic
Republic, we can use data from a household survey conducted in 1990 (the last year of
the GDR's existence) to quantify the impact of bequest motives on the demand for life
insurance while controlling for life-cycle and precautionary savings motives.
Our key empirical ¯ndings con¯rm the predictions from a stylized theoretical model
of life-insurance demand. First, the probability to own tax-exempt whole life insurance
contracts increases by 5.2 percent among households a®ected by the tax reform in 2000
(i.e., among those households loosing their exemption from capital income taxation).
Second, there is also strong indication that households in the former GDR { where life-
insurance demand was not diluted by tax considerations { purchased life insurance to
bequeath wealth to their children, whereas provision for non-working partners seems to
play a lesser role.
This paper proceeds by discussing some key theoretical predictions from a formal
model of life-insurance demand in section 2. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4
analyzes the impact of the German tax reform in 2000 on life-insurance demand. In
section 5, estimates of the strength of bequest motives in GDR life-insurance demand are
reported. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusions.
2 A life-cycle model with tax incentives and bequests
A number of papers in the economics literature model the demand for term life insurance.
Term insurance pays a bene¯t if the insured dies before a certain date. The ¯rst model for
term life insurance in a continuous time setting is Yaari (1965). Fischer (1973) develops a
life cycle model of term life-insurance demand in discrete time and discusses the allocation
3of insurance purchases over the life cycle. Less common is the modelling of whole life
insurance. Whole life insurance requires the build-up of insurance reserves because the
insured typically pays premiums only during working life. These premiums must also
¯nance later obligations. Many whole life insurance contracts enable the insured to take
out those reserves (the cash value or surrender value) after a certain age, and therefore
resemble a combination of term life insurance with a savings plan. Babbel and Ohtsuka
(1989) build a three-period model with uncertainty about future rates of return and health
status that allows for simultaneous purchase of term life insurance and whole life insurance,
overcoming the problem that whole life insurance is usually dominated by a combination
of term life insurance and a savings plan. However, their model is inherently di±cult
to solve even with sophisticated numerical methods. Moreover, Babbel and Ohtsuka
do neither capture the tax preferences of life insurance nor consider the e®ect of public
pension programs on life-insurance demand.
This paper derives life-insurance demand in a model with a \joy-of-giving" bequest
motive, following the standard approach in the literature (one exception is Lewis, 1989).
The model has three periods and three types of assets, life insurance, bonds, and public
pensions. Life insurance is modelled as a combination of term life insurance and a savings
plan. Our speci¯cation incorporates the salient features of the German tax and pension
system.2
In the three-period model, the timing convention used is as follows: consumption
streams in the three periods are indexed by 0, 1, and 2, and end-of-period bequests are
indexed by 1, 2, 3, respectively. A consumer can use his income to purchase life insurance
L at a premium Z per unit, or save an amount S of bonds. Bonds earn a rate of return
r and the return is subject to a capital income tax of ¿C. Moreover, individuals must
contribute to a public pension system with a payroll tax ¿S and they receive pensions in
old age. The pension system has an internal rate of return of g.
2 This model was ¯rst presented by Walliser and Winter (1999).



















where ± represents the pure rate of time preference, ° is the risk aversion parameter of
the constant relative risk aversion utility function, ´ is the weight on bequests and ¼t is
the probability to survive at the beginning of period t. Since death at the end of period
2 is certain, ¼3 = 0.
To simplify notation, let 1+ r = R, 1+r(1¡¿C) = RC, and 1+g = G. The utility
maximization is then subject to the following budget constraints in the ¯rst two periods
(t = 0;1):
ct = wt(1 ¡ ¿
S) ¡ ZtLt+1 ¡ St+1 + StR
C + ®Lt (2)
bt+1 = St+1R + Lt+1: (3)
Here, w stands for labor earnings. ® is the exogenous savings portion of the life insurance
contract { if the policy holder survives, a fraction of the insurance sum (the cash value)
can be withdrawn. Note also that in case of death the estate receives the full rate of
return on bonds, implicitly assuming that there are no estate taxes to be paid.
Consumers retire in their third period of life and receive a public pension. Since life
ends with certainty after period 2, there is no role for life insurance in the last period.
Consequently, the budget constraints are as follows:
c2 = ¿
S(w0G
2 + w1G) ¡ S3 + S2R
C + ®L2 (4)
b3 = S3R: (5)
The ¯rst order conditions imply the following relationship between consumption in


























Using equations (6), (7) and (8), the consumer's maximization problem can be solved re-
cursively. The algebraic solution is fairly complicated and therefore provides few immedi-
ate insights (see the Appendix). However, the ¯rst-order conditions o®er some qualitative
predictions for variations in key variables. In general, people buy life insurance for three
reasons in our model: ¯rst, life insurance enhances bequeathable wealth and is therefore
valuable especially at younger ages when savings are still small. Second, life insurance
has a tax advantage over other savings. Third, if the consumer considers public pension
coverage as too generous he can de-annuitize by purchasing life insurance.3
Consider ¯rst the impact of tax changes on portfolio choices. Suppose two house-
holds have the same household income but di®er in their tax rate on capital income ¿C.
According to equations (6) and (7), the two households would di®er in their consump-
tion, bequest, and portfolio choices. As indicated by equation (6), a household facing a
lower tax rate (higher RC) would choose a steeper consumption pro¯le because higher
after-tax rates of returns make future consumption \cheaper." As shown in equation (7),
that household would also choose to bequeath less than the household facing higher tax
since lower taxes make future consumption cheaper but do not a®ect the implicit price
for bequests. Equations (6) and (7) and the budget constraints also imply a di®erent
portfolio choice. For reasonable parameter choices, the household with lower tax rates
can satisfy (6) and (7) simultaneously only if it holds less life insurance and more savings
than the household with higher tax rates. Lowering life insurance by a dollar and increas-
ing savings by a dollar in period 0 reduces consumption by Z0 ¡ 1 dollars. Under the




R , which is less than 1, the reallocation
thus reduces resources in the ¯rst period. It increases resources in the following period by
3 Yaari (1965) discusses why in perfect markets purchasing life insurance is equivalent to purchasing a
negative annuity.
6RC ¡® which exceeds 1 for reasonable parameter choices.4 Moreover, such a reallocation
increases bequests by R¡1, which is smaller than RC ¡® as long as (R¡1)¿c +® is less
than 1, which again is the case for reasonable parameter choices. In summary, reallocating
a dollar from life insurance to savings lowers current resources, increases future resources,
and increases future resources for consumption more than for bequests.
An analogous argument holds for changes in the parameter ® that determines the
savings content of whole life insurance. Lowering ® has the same e®ect on ¯rst-order
conditions as lowering the tax rate on capital income. Thus, quite intuitively, equations
(6) and (7) together with the budget constraints also predict that lowering the implicit
savings portion of life insurance leads households to shift more resources away from life
insurance and towards regular savings.
As equation (7) demonstrates, increasing the strength of bequest motives leads to the
result that the relative size of bequest to consumption must increase, while the relative size
of consumption in di®erent periods remains constant according to equation (6). Clearly,
the less costly way to increase bequests is to purchase more life insurance. However, unlike
the previous results, it depends on speci¯c parameter values whether both saving and life
insurance increase or whether life-insurance demand increases and savings falls.
Finally, varying the size of the public pension system also matters for both saving
and life insurance. As is well known, public pensions crowd out private savings in a life-
cycle model. To the extent that life insurance is a savings instrument, one would therefore
expect life-insurance demand to fall. However, for people who feel that the public pension
is too generous, purchasing more life insurance is a way to increase bequest and reduce the
\overannuitization". Thus, the precise e®ect of public pension coverage on life-insurance
demand depends on the relative magnitude of the savings and bequest motives.
To summarize, the stylized life-cycle model presented in this section delivers two
main testable predictions regarding life-insurance demand. First, controlling for income,
people facing lower relative tax rates on other savings should purchase less whole life
4 For example, assuming interest rates of three percent per year, a value of ® of around 0.2 implies in a
three period model that roughly 80 percent of life insurance premiums contribute to the accumulation
of reserves in the ¯rst period of life.
7insurance to accommodate a steeper consumption pro¯le. Second, people with stronger
bequest motives, for example married people or households with children, should have
stronger incentives to purchase life insurance. The impact of public pension coverage on
life-insurance demand is ambiguous.
3 The data
The German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) o®ers a unique opportunity to study the
e®ect of tax reform and bequest motives on the demand for life insurance. It is the only
dataset that contains annual information about life insurance ownership and portfolio
choice of German households that spans from pre- to post-reform years. We can study
portfolios in the territory of the GDR, where the ¯rst GSOEP interview was conducted in
1990 (prior to reuni¯cation) with a sample of around 2000 households. The ¯rst survey in
the West was conducted in 1984. Since then, the sample has been signi¯cantly increased
in 1998 and 2000. Descriptive evidence for the development of the sample is provided in
table 2.5
Households are asked annually if they owned one or more life insurance policies in
the previous year. Thus, we only use observations for households that take part in two
successive surveys. If not otherwise stated, socioeconomic characteristics are proxied by
the household head. We approximate marginal tax rates by re-calculating each house-
hold's taxable income from its (estimated) tax payments, using the o±cial formulas of the
federal tax o±ce.6 A 1 unit change in taxable income is simulated in order to approximate
the marginal tax rate. Socioeconomic characteristics are proxied by the household head.
5 The Add-On package PanelWhiz for Stata (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) has been used for extracting
the data. See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details. The PanelWhiz generated do ¯le to retrieve
the data used here is available upon request. Any data or computational errors are our own.
6 The GSOEP estimates of total tax payments are based on Schwarze's (1995) approach. Schwarze adds
up the incomes of all household members and applies standard deductions based on the socioeconomic
status of the household.
84 Tax incentives
Life insurance is the second most common asset after savings accounts in Germany. In
2007, 15.6 percent of total private wealth, amounting to 716 billion Euro, was allocated
to life insurance (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2008). Overall, 93.9 million life insurance poli-
cies existed, of which 7,617,400 had been sold in that year (Gesamtverband der Deutschen
Versicherungswirtschaft, 2008). On the °ipside of the market, around 49 percent of house-
holds own life insurance policies.7
One of the main reasons for this unusually high popularity in Germany is suspected
to be the favored ¯scal treatment of life insurance policies (and whole life insurance in
particular). First, returns on life insurances are tax exempt if the contract lasts for at
least 12 years, premiums are paid during at least ¯ve years, and the term life insurance
component amounts to at least 60 percent of the total bene¯t paid out at the end of the
contract. Second, annual contributions to whole life and term life insurance contracts are
tax deductible. However, this is typically of little bene¯t for employees, as they reach
the deductibility cap with their obligatory contributions to the social security system.
Obligatory contributions are smaller for civil servants and the deductibility cap is higher
for the self-employed, who are generally exempt from contributing to the public pension
system and must provide for their own retirement income and survivor's bene¯ts (Sommer,
2007). Our analysis includes controls for the self-employed and civil servants to account
for these variations in e®ective deductability. Finally, in the case of bequests, only two-
thirds of the cash value of life insurance policies are taxed. It is even possible to avoid
estate taxes altogether if, for instance, one spouse pays premiums into a life insurance
policy owned by the other spouse, who also is the bene¯ciary if she dies early.
Insert figure 1 about here.
The 2000 tax reform had a major impact on the treatment of whole life insurance, and
it had a visible e®ect on whole life insurance sales trends. Figure 1 plots the development
of sales of new life insurance contracts between 1995 and 2003 in Germany. During the
7 Authors' calculation based on data from the GSOEP. Typically, life insurance policies have one bene-
¯ciary, so that it makes sense for households with several children to invest into several policies.
9entire period, sales of term life insurance policies are relatively constant around 700,000.
However, sales of new whole life contracts spike in 1999, indicating an anticipation e®ect
of the tax reform. As taxpayer groups have been a®ected di®erently by the reforms, in
this paper we can clearly identify the response of households' savings allocation to changes
in after-tax yields.
4.1 The tax reform of 2000
Germany taxes all interest and dividend income exceeding a certain threshold at the
households' marginal tax rate. The development of this threshold, the so-called Spar-
erfreibetrag (tax exemption limit), is shown in table 1 for the period from 1996 and 2001.
In March 1999, a law was passed, cutting the tax exemption limit from DM6,000 (12,000)
to DM3,000 (6,000) for singles (couples) from January 1, 2000 onward. We suspect that
households between the old and the new tax exemption limit were disproportionately
a®ected by this reform. As their capital returns were fully exempt from taxation be-
forehand, the reform created a strong incentive to shelter their savings from taxation by
purchasing whole life insurance when the reform was announced. In other words, if these
households are responsive to the relative tax treatment, we should see a disproportionate
increase of life insurance purchases among the group threatened to have their regular
savings income taxed by the reduction of tax exemptions. In what follows, we denote
households belonging to this category as the \treatment group".
In order to identify the treatment group, we use survey responses on capital income
levels. One quarter of all households report their exact income from interest and dividends
in the survey, whereas three quarters indicate on an ordinal scale if their capital income is
less than 500, between 500-2,000, 2,000-5,000, 5,000-10,000, or above 10,000 DM. These
ordinal thresholds reduce precision of estimating the response to tax changes, biasing
the results against ¯nding signi¯cant di®erences between groups. We use a di®erence-
in-di®erences estimator to test if the treatment group is more likely to own one or more
(tax-exempt) life insurance policies from 2000 onward.
Insert table 1 about here.
10Our empirical analysis is subject to two additional considerations. First, in June
1999, the government proposed to abolish the tax exemption on life insurance returns by
end 1999. Many households were concerned about losing a tax-favored savings opportu-
nity, boosting sales of new contracts by 38.7 percent in 1999. Dolle-Helms (1999a, 199b)
provides anecdotal evidence that last minute purchases in 1999 were mainly driven by
tax motives. The reform eventually failed in the upper house of parliament (Bundesrat)
in mid-December and many investors (unsuccessfully) claimed their money back. All
households, including those above the tax exemption limit, were also potentially a®ected
by the proposed and later dropped reform in 1999. To identify the impact of the 2000
tax reform that a®ected the relative tax treatment of life insurance and other savings for
people below the DM6,000 limit we test if, from 1999 onward, the ownership probabil-
ity among the treatment group increases relative to wealthier households whose capital
income was already above the DM6,000 exemption limit. The implicit underlying iden-
tifying assumption is that both the treatment and control group responded equally (in
proportional terms) to the announced phasing out of tax advantages for life insurance.
Second, the 2000 reform may also have had an impact on those households already pay-
ing taxes on capital income since their total tax exempt amounts fell. However, these
households would not be at the margin of being subject to paying capital income taxes. If
tax incentives matter, households with high capital incomes should already have invested
into life insurance before the reform in order to shelter their savings from taxation, and
the response would be intra-marginal.
Insert table 2 about here.
Descriptive evidence in table 2 con¯rms that indeed signi¯cant changes only occurred
in the treatment group. Life insurance ownership rates remained constant among house-
holds below the new tax exemption limit and above the old exemption limit. However,
the ownership rate increased strongly from 62.5 to 69.7 percent in the treatment group
in 1999. This shows that households a®ected by the tax reform in 2000 advanced their
investments and stocked up on (tax-exempt) life insurance policies before the reform came
into e®ect.
114.2 Empirical results
We estimate a reduced-form model in order to analyze the e®ect of tax reform on life-
insurance demand. In particular, a before-and-after comparison is made between a control
group of investors that are una®ected by the reform with a treatment group that is
a®ected by the new tax regime, using a di®erence-in-di®erences estimator on repeated
cross-sectional data. We denote individual i's binary indicator for the treatment group
as Gi. For the reform in 2000, the treated are de¯ned as Git = 1flimitnew · INCCAP
it ·
limitoldg, where INCCAP
it denotes total capital income. Ti = 1ft ¸ 1999g is a time
dummy indicating the anticipated reform. To ease the notational burden, we introduce
the shorthand Yi2g;t for YijGi = g;Ti = t: The potential outcomes with and without
treatment are Y 1
i and Y 0




i = ®Ti + ¯Gi + ²i;
where ²i ? (Ti;Gi): The model for the treatment group is
Y
1
i = ® + ¯ + ¿
DiD + ²i;
In the absence of intervention, the average outcome for the treatment group is E[Y 0
i21;1] =







= E[Yi21;1] ¡ E[Yi21;0] ¡ (E[Yi20;1] ¡ E[Yi20;0]):
This estimator requires three identifying assumptions. First, we assume that the tax
reform is exogenous to the ownership decision. Investors were hit by surprise, when the
tax reforms were announced in 1999, since the reforms were not mentioned in election
campaigns or the coalition program of the incoming government. We can also safely
exclude the possibility of policy endogeneity, because the reform was not introduced to
change the demand for life insurance by di®erent taxpayer groups. It was part of a
major tax reform package with the aim of broadening the tax base. Second, we assume
that there are no group speci¯c trends in life insurance ownership. This assumption
guarantees that the counterfactual of the treated can be inferred from the time trend of
12the control group. As discussed above, this assumption certainly holds for households
above the new exemption limit. Third, we assume that the tax reform is exogenous
with respect to sample composition. Essentially, this requires that household income as
well as interest and dividend income did not change as a result of the tax reform itself.
This condition would fail if interest and dividend income fell when a household buys life
insurance. However, households typically pay annual premiums of less than DM2,000
(Sommer, 2007) which would only marginally a®ect total capital income at reasonable
interest rates. In any event, the presence of such wealth e®ects would rather bias the
results against our hypothesis.
Insert table 3 about here.
The upper panel of table 3 reports the average e®ects of the tax reform, using a
sample from three years before and three years after the announcement of the reform.8
While ownership rates of life insurance fell among households in the control group from
2000 onwards, an increase by 4.5 percent can be observed for the treatment group. The
di®erence-in-di®erences estimate according to equation (9) is 5.7 percent for the full sam-
ple and 5.9 percent for households above the new exemption limit.9
These estimates may be biased for two reasons. First, the estimated probabilities
of investing into life insurance do not necessarily lie in the [0;1] interval. Second, the
e®ects could be blurred because other determinants account for di®erent behavior across
groups. Thus, we translate the di®erence-in-di®erences approach into a probit regression
that imposes bounds on the estimated probabilities and accounts for other covariates.
The model for the outcome without intervention is given by
P(Y
0
i = 1jGi;Ti;xi = ©(®Ti + ¯Gi + xi±);
where x is a vector of additional regressors and ± denotes the vector of associated param-
eters. The model for the treatment group is
P(Y
1
i21;1 = 1jxi) = ©(® + ¯ + ° + xi±);
8 The analysis controls for the approximated marginal tax rate of the household, which incorporates the
changes due to the 2001 tax reform.
9 Estimates are similar, if all observations for the transition year 1999 are dropped.
13Puhani (2008) shows that in a nonlinear model, such as probit, the treatment e®ect on
the treated should not be confused with the cross-derivative of the interaction term (Ai
and Norton, 2003). Based on the standard probit di®erence-in-di®erences model
P(Yi = 1jGi;Ti;xi) = ©(®Ti + ¯Gi + °TiGi + xi±);












(©(b ® + b ¯ + b ° + xib ±) ¡ ©(b ® + b ¯ + xib ±)):
Hence, the treatment e®ect is zero if and only if the coe±cient ° is zero. We apply
the delta-method to infer statistical signi¯cance of the average treatment e®ect in small
samples. Di®erent from the linear model, identi¯cation is not provided by the assumption
that the cross di®erence ° is zero for the expected potential outcome Y 0
i , because group
and time di®erences in the conditional expectation of the potential outcome Y 0
i are not
constant in the nonlinear probit model. However, a nonlinear parametric restriction on
that cross-di®erence guarantees that all expected outcomes (factual or counterfactual) are
bounded as required (Athey and Imbens, 2006).
Insert table 4 about here.
Table 4 reports summary statistics of the additional covariates included in the regression.
In particular, we include the marginal tax rate to control for di®erences in after-tax re-
turns. We proxy for the household's net labor income via binary indicators for deciles of
the income distribution. Dummies for house ownership as well as interest and dividend
returns control for household wealth. Furthermore, martial status and a binary indica-
tor for households with one or more children, as in Hurd (1987, 1989), capture bequest
motives. Dummies for employment status, civil servants and the self-employed re°ect
speci¯c characteristics of the German tax and public pension system. Finally, the model
includes gender, education, and linear and non-linear terms of the age of the household
head. We use data for three years before and after the reform. The full sample consists
of 44,540 observations and 2,419 if we constrain the analysis to households above the new
exemption limit.
14Insert table 5 about here.
Table 5 reports average marginal e®ects for continuous and dummy variables. The in-
teraction e®ect b ¿DiD is statistically signi¯cant at the 5 percent level in both equations.
According to equation (10), the tax reform increased ownership among households af-
fected by the reform by 5.2 percent. The estimate is 8.9 percent for the restricted sample
in column (2). Furthermore, the estimates of the marginal e®ects in columns (1) and (2)
show a highly signi¯cant positive correlation between marginal tax rates and investment
into life insurance. The model in column (1) suggests that an increase of the marginal
tax rate by 10 percentage points increases the ownership probability by 3.3 percentage
points. Also, there is evidence that the self-employed, who have larger tax incentives and
lower pensions, are more likely to own life insurance policies. We ¯nd no evidence that
life insurance ownership is higher among civil servants, who typically receive relatively
generous survivor bene¯ts.
Our results contrast with Jappelli and Pistaferri (2003, 2007) who do not ¯nd that
tax incentives matter for life-insurance demand in Italy. However, anecdotal evidence
suggests that sales agents exploited the favorable market situation in Germany deriving
from the tax changes, whereas Italian insurers lacked the incentive to point out the e®ects
of the tax reform among potential investors. Moreover, the tax incentive resulting from
incremental changes in after-tax yields in Italy might be too small to induce signi¯cant
changes in investment behavior if inertia is present in portfolio adjustments.
The ¯ndings from the natural tax experiment are less clear with regard to bequest
motives. Although there is strong evidence that married couples invest into life insurance,
we cannot con¯rm that households with children are more likely to own life insurance.
These mixed results are much in line with the previous literature that ¯nds evidence in
both directions. One reason for these ambiguous results stems from the impossibility of
past studies to neatly single out bequest motives from other forms of savings motives. For
instance, we would be unable to identify bequest motives in the presence of strong tax
incentives if households with children were liquidity constrained in the short run. Also,
households with children could use the separate tax exemption limits for their children in
order to avoid capital income taxation and thereby distort the separate identi¯ability of
15tax and bequest motives. Yet the empirical evidence for the importance of tax incentives
among the relevant households persuasively shows that taxation is a signi¯cant factor in
households savings decisions. In order to identify bequest motives, however, an additional
experimental setting is needed that eliminates distortionary tax e®ects.
5 Bequest motives
Our identi¯cation strategy for bequest motives in life insurance relies crucially on the
assumption that the speci¯c institutional environment in the GDR allows us to control
for the main alternative savings motives discussed in the literature such as tax, life-cycle,
and precautionary savings motives (Browning and Lusardi, 1996). The following section
describes the peculiarities of the market for life insurance in the GDR as it prevailed until
German uni¯cation in late 1990. Throughout the section, bequest motives are de¯ned
as a willful desire to hand on one's wealth to close relatives or friends during lifetime or
posthumously.
5.1 Savings environment in the GDR
Whole life insurance played an important role in household portfolios in the GDR. Be-
fore reuni¯cation, East Germans could only chose between investing into savings accounts
or life insurance. Therefore, life insurance was typically considered a long-term savings
contract (with an additional term life insurance option). While savings accounts o®ered
a unitary interest rate of 3.25 percent (Schwarzer, 1999), calculatory returns on life in-
surance were about 3.5 percent plus a 15 percent terminal bonus. The only provider of
insurance was the Staatliche Versicherung der DDR, of which Allianz acquired the private
client business after reuni¯cation.10
Tax incentives. A major advantage of studying life-insurance demand in the GDR
is that returns on savings accounts and insurances were fully exempt from taxation. Also,
the bene¯ciary of a life insurance policy was exempt from death taxes (Schulze, 1970).
10 We thank Dr. Michael Lehner from Allianz for providing detailed information about the life insurance
market in the GDR.
16Di®erent from all existing studies on bequest motives, our analysis will therefore not be
diluted by tax considerations.
Life-cycle savings motives. Another key feature of savings decisions in the GDR
is that consumption possibilities were very limited, enabling us to control for ownership
of all goods and services for which GDR citizens needed to accumulated large deposits. In
particular, we can control for the ¯ve main life-cycle and down-payment motives: First,
we can condition for life-cycle saving e®ects through linear and nonlinear terms of age as
well as an indicator for the retirement status of the household head. Around 40 percent
of all retirees participated in an additional retirement pension supplement plan. However,
average pensions were about 450 (550 with the supplement) Mark in 1986, compared to
an average labor income of 960 Mark (Dabbert, 1992).11 Hence, the elderly had to rely
on their savings for a su±cient retirement income. Second, households had little incentive
to use life insurance to accumulate deposits for buying an own apartment or house. The
communist government restricted ownership of private property and largely subsidized
construction of rental housing. Also, it was very cheap to live in a rented apartment,
since rents were ¯xed by the central government and too low to recover maintenance
cost (Manzel, 1992). Third, only few durables required large downpayments. There is
anecdotal evidence that life insurance contracts were used to buy cars. This was a sensible
thing to do, because the average duration of life insurance policies, 11.6 years, matched
the average delivery time for a car, 13.5 years (Wolle, 1999).12 The only other durables
for which large deposits were necessary are motorcycles and weekend houses (Datschas).
The data allow us to control for these three durables when estimating the strength of
bequest motives. Fourth, we rule out the possibility that citizens used life insurance as
a means to save for travel. The duration of life insurance policies does typically not
match the decision to travel. Moreover, travel restrictions were not lifted before the 1970s
and even then GDR citizens could only travel to four foreign countries without a visa
11 The Deutsche Mark (DM) should not be confused with the Mark which was the o±cial currency of
the GDR. Mark (East) were exchanged 1:1 for Deutsche Mark (DM) in 1990. However, the cash value
of life insurance policies and savings above 4,000 Mark were exchanged 2:1.
12 A fashionable nickname for life insurance used to be Trabi-Sparvertrag (savings contract for a Trabant
(\Trabi") car).
17(Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria). Often, travelling was further complicated
by scarce foreign exchange (Saretzki and Kohn, 1992). Other leisure activities did typically
not require larger amounts of money. Yet some social activities may a®ect mortality risk
(sports) or provide an information network that increases the awareness for life insurance
products. The regression includes indicators for households that go at least once a month
to the cinema or theater, a cultural event, the church, do active sports, visit friends, or
help neighbors. Fifth, private spending on education did not exist under the communist
regime in the GDR. The government fully paid for primary and higher education as well
as vocational training (Marggraf, 1992). Access to higher education required membership
in the GDR youth organization (FDJ), and favored entry for children from working class
backgrounds.
Precautionary savings motives. Economists disagree sharply as to why people
bequeath wealth. In contrast to the view that bequests are intentional, Hurd (1987)
suggests that bequest are only an accidental remnant of precautionary savings. Yet the
social system in the GDR gave very few reasons to accumulate wealth as a bu®er for
uncertain times. We believe that our regression captures the remaining precautionary
motives and therefore yields reliable estimates of the strength of bequest motives. First,
East Germans did not have to hedge against income °uctuations, because full employment
was constitutionally guaranteed. Fuchs-SchÄ undeln and SchÄ undeln (2005) also argue that
income di®erences and volatility were very low. Second, we control for the self-assessed
health status of each individual, which could a®ect precautionary savings, although health
services were fully provided by the central government as well.13 Third, respondents were
asked if they are dissatis¯ed or very dissatis¯ed with the social bene¯ts available in the
GDR. Dissatisfaction could denote a larger demand for precautionary savings. Finally,
the survey elicited a proxy for individual risk attitudes using a direct question on how
willing the respondent is to take on risks, with responses given on an eleven-point scale.
Bequest motives. If bequests are intentional, they may either re°ect altruism
(Tomes, 1981), self-interested exchange with one's heirs (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Sum-
13 The questionnaire reads, \How satis¯ed are you with your health?" Answers are given on an eleven-
point scale.
18mers, 1985), or the outcome of an intra-household reallocation of incomes (Gandol¯ and
Miners, 1996). Gandol¯ and Miners argue that families insure the labor income of the
main bread-earner through life insurance. We proxy for potential reallocation motives by
the wife's labor force participation status and the income di®erential. Like Hurd (1987,
1989) and JÄ urges (2001), we use a dummy indicating if a household has one or more chil-
dren in order to proxy for altruistic and strategic motives. The questionnaire also asks
the households head if his family is very important to his sense of well-being and personal
satisfaction. However, it is di±cult to di®erentiate altruistic from strategic motives, since
the survey does not ask for the intention of households' bequests.
5.2 Empirical results
Age pro¯les for life insurance ownership rates in the GDR are depicted in ¯gure 2. Note
that age and cohort e®ects cannot be separately identi¯ed, as we only use a single cross-
section of data in this section. Ownership rates display a hump shape that is broadly
consistent with life-cycle insurance demand as derived from the model in section 2. Life
insurance ownership peaks between ages 20 to 40, while in older ages households cash out
their insurance policies.
Insert figure 2 about here.
Descriptive evidence for the presence of bequest motives in GDR life-insurance demand
is presented in table 6. Insurance ownership is clearly higher among married couples,
households with children, households with higher labor incomes, civil servants, and house
owners. Education and wealth seem to play a minor role. The descriptive evidence is hard
to reconcile with the notion of intra-household reallocation motives. While ownership rates
are higher for households with lager income di®erences, the contrary holds if the partner
is not participating in the labor force.
Insert table 6 about here.
We estimate probit models for the ownership probability in 1990. Table 7 reports average
marginal e®ects for continuous and dummy variables. We do not report separate average
partial e®ects for the hump shaped e®ects of age and income on the ownership decision.
19All speci¯cations provide robust evidence for the presence of bequest motives among
households with children.14 On average, households with children are 7 percentage points
more likely to own life insurance. Column (5) also controls for the attitudes of investors.
Only investors for whom family is very important show a signi¯cantly higher participation
probability of around seven percentage points. No signi¯cant correlation arises between
insurance demand and attitudes such as security-consciousness, importance of social se-
curity, or self-assessed health status. In the speci¯cation reported in column (6), we also
include indicators of leisure activities which may re°ect social interaction e®ects (Hong,
Kubik, and Stein, 2004). However, these indicators are neither individually nor jointly
signi¯cant.
Because many households cash out their whole life insurance policies at retirement,
we test whether that fact has a signi¯cant impact on regression results. Column (7)
presents estimates for a subsample of households whose head's age is less than 65 years.
In this subsample, age e®ects are insigni¯cant indicating that age pro¯les are similar
among the working population. The previous ¯ndings are broadly con¯rmed in this
smaller sample. Estimates of potential bequest motives are statistically signi¯cant and of
similar size, as in the full sample. There is no indication that investors insure the labor
income of the main earner.
Insert table 7 about here.
6 Conclusions
Whole life insurance plays an important role in household saving. In a stylized model, both
tax incentives and bequest motives drive whole life-insurance demand. While a bequest
motive could be satis¯ed by term life insurance, sheltering savings from capital income
taxation is only possible with whole life policies. The empirical evidence we presented in
this paper is consistent with the theoretical predictions.
14 Results reported on column (4) suggest that the probability to own one or more life insurance policies
does not depend on the number of children within the household.
20The 2000 tax reform, which halved the tax exemption limit for capital income in
Germany, can be seen as a natural experiment. Underpinned with a rich dataset, it o®ers
a rare opportunity to study the impact of increases in capital income taxation on portfolio
choice. We ¯nd that the 2000 tax change induced a signi¯cant shift of portfolios towards
tax-exempt assets. Demand for life insurance increased signi¯cantly among the group of
households that did not pay taxes on capital returns prior to the reform. Our estimates
imply that an increase in the marginal tax rate by 10 percentage points increased life
insurance ownership probabilities by 3.3 percentage points. Further, the tax reform we
studied increased life insurance ownership probabilities by 5.2 percentage points among
the group of households a®ected by the reform. These result suggest that standard tax
revenue estimates, which assume that current investors would stick to their asset choices
if capital taxation was introduced, may be misleading. Policy makers need to account for
changes in investment behavior due to tax reforms (Poterba and Verdugo, 2008).
With regard to bequest motives, we analyzed the demand for life insurance in the
experimental setting of the former communist East Germany, using data from 1990, just
before German uni¯cation. Because of the peculiar institutional settings in the GDR, our
estimates are not diluted by tax considerations or life-cycle and precautionary savings
motives. We ¯nd a signi¯cantly higher ownership probability among households with
children and a high regard for the family. Life-insurance demand does not seem to depend
on intra-household allocation motives. As a note of caution, our results are based on
a very peculiar institutional setting. Yet in contrast to our priors, and in favor of a
broader applicability of our ¯ndings, life-insurance demand in the GDR demonstrates the
importance of bequest motives for life insurance purchases { despite the presence of a
communist nanny state.
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The solution for c0 in combination with equations (6), (7) and (8) immediately
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Figure 1: The graph depicts sales of new life insurance contracts in 2007 in Germany. Source:
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Figure 2: The graph depicts the (smoothed) average life insurance ownership rate in East Germany,
1990. Source: GSOEP.
28Table 1: Tax exemption limits on capital income
Period Exemption limit Treatment group Treatment group






single 6000 DM 3,000-6,000 DM 2,000-5,000 DM
(couple) (12,000) (6,000-12,000) (5,000-10,000)
2000-2001
single 3000 DM 3,000-6,000 DM 2,000-5,000 DM
(couple) (12,000) (6,000-12,000) (5,000-10,000)
Note: The table reports the development of tax exemption limits on capital
income in Germany for singles (married couples). The thresholds for the old
and new exemption limits, limitold and limitnew, de¯ne the upper and lower
bounds of the treatment group and are either assigned by exact or categorical
(indicated by tilde) interest and dividend returns.
29Table 2: Tax incentives - average ownership rates 1996-2001
as a % of all observations in the subpopulation
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Full sample 54.72 55.79 54.56 55.29 54.67 52.38
N 6,594 6,383 7,159 6,980 11,662 11,193
INCCAP < limitnew 54.28 55.52 54.20 54.48 54.09 51.85
N 6,278 6,092 6,816 6,533 10,959 10,703
INCCAP > limitold 64.84 67.71 60.36 62.58 63.11 62.29
N 91 96 111 163 225 175
limitnew < INCCAP < limitold 62.67 58.46 62.50 69.72 64.02 65.08
N 225 195 232 284 478 315
Note: The table reports average ownership rates of life insurance policies for
di®erent subpopulations. INCCAP denotes total capital income.
30Table 3: Tax incentives - Di®erence-in-Di®erences
treated non-treated Di®erence N
between
groups
E®ect of the tax reform.
N 1,729 47,961 49,690
After the reform (1999-2001) 0.658 0.536 0.123 29,554
(0.014) (0.003) (0.015)
Before the reform (1996-1999) 0.613 0.548 0.066 20,136
(0.019) (0.004) (0.020)
Di®erence within groups 0.045 -0.012 0.057
(0.024) (0.005) (0.000)
E®ect of the tax reform, INCCAP > limitnew.
N 1,729 861 2,590
After the reform (1999-2001) 0.658 0.627 0.031 1,640
(0.014) (0.020) (0.025)
Before the reform (1996-1999) 0.613 0.641 -0.028
(0.028) (0.019) (0.034) 950
Di®erence within groups 0.045 -0.014 0.059
(0.024) (0.035) (0.001)
Note: The upper panel reports average ownership rates of life insurance policies
for the years 1996-2001. The bottom panel reports averages for all households
with a capital income INCCAP > limitnew. The di®erence-in-di®erence estimate
is reported in bold face in the bottom right cell of each panel. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
31Table 4: Tax incentives - summary statistics
full sample INCCAP >
limitnew
marginal tax rate 0.249 0.338
woman D 0.376 0.277
age 48.87 52.39
children D 0.340 0.218
married D 0.829 0.730
10 years schooling D 0.280 0.250
13 years schooling D 0.200 0.424
college D 0.086 0.132
university D 0.100 0.240
self-employed D 0.057 0.136
civil servant D 0.045 0.070
retired D 0.283 0.320
unemployed D 0.078 0.035
Hhold income decile 1 D 0.099 0.026
Hhold income decile 2 D 0.103 0.039
Hhold income decile 3 D 0.097 0.054
Hhold income decile 4 D 0.101 0.070
Hhold income decile 6 D 0.111 0.100
Hhold income decile 7 D 0.097 0.078
Hhold income decile 8 D 0.097 0.111
Hhold income decile 9 D 0.099 0.174
Hhold income decile 10 D 0.094 0.284
owns house D 0.405 0.632
returns < 2,000 DM D 0.231
returns < 5,000 DM D 0.084
returns < 10,000 DM D 0.033
returns > 10,000 DM D 0.016
N 44,540 2,419
Sample years 1996-2001 1996-2001
Note: The samples are from the GSOEP. Demographic vari-
ables refer to the household head. Dummy variables are
marked by D.
32Table 5: Tax incentives - average marginal e®ects
(1) (2)
full sample INCCAP > limitnew
estimate st.error estimate st.error
b ¿DiD D 0.052** (0.024) 0.089** (0.046)
T D 0.010 (0.006) -0.040 (0.037)
G D -0.006 (0.021) -0.057 (0.036)
marginal tax rate 0.329*** (0.026) 0.250*** (0.089)
woman D 0.003 (0.008) -0.075** (0.031)
age/10 0.153*** (0.017) 0.102* (0.056)
(age/10)2 -0.021*** (0.002) -0.017*** (0.005)
children D -0.000 (0.009) 0.033 (0.035)
married D 0.062*** (0.012) 0.099*** (0.037)
10 years schooling D 0.059*** (0.009) -0.037 (0.035)
13 years schooling D 0.003 (0.012) -0.096*** (0.036)
college D 0.005 (0.014) 0.048 (0.039)
university D -0.024 (0.015) -0.002 (0.040)
self-employed D 0.044*** (0.014) 0.020 (0.041)
civil servant D 0.025 (0.018) -0.002 (0.048)
retired D -0.008 (0.013) -0.078* (0.044)
unemployed D -0.022** (0.011) 0.031 (0.057)
Hhold income decile 1 D -0.173*** (0.014) -0.035 (0.084)
Hhold income decile 2 D -0.082*** (0.013) 0.060 (0.063)
Hhold income decile 3 D -0.068*** (0.013) -0.018 (0.061)
Hhold income decile 4 D -0.040*** (0.011) 0.029 (0.051)
Hhold income decile 6 D 0.023** (0.011) 0.047 (0.047)
Hhold income decile 7 D 0.030** (0.012) 0.054 (0.050)
Hhold income decile 8 D 0.039*** (0.012) 0.045 (0.048)
Hhold income decile 9 D 0.044*** (0.013) 0.075 (0.046)
Hhold income decile 10 D 0.068*** (0.014) 0.156*** (0.041)
owns house D 0.071*** (0.008) 0.057* (0.029)
returns < 2,000 DM D 0.080*** (0.007)
returns < 5,000 DM D 0.034*** (0.011)
returns < 10,000 DM D 0.030* (0.016)
returns > 10,000 DM D 0.039 (0.026)
Suppressed: year dummies, constant.
N 44,540 2,419
Pseudo-R2 0.171 0.209
Â2 (prob:) 3,249.2 (0.000) 275.9 (0.000)
Sample years 1996-2001 1996-2001
D indicates dummy variables. Average marginal e®ects are reported. Robust
and clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
signi¯cance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level.
33Table 6: Bequest motives - summary statistics
subsamples All observations
owner non-owner
Mean Mean Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
age 43.2 53.5 46.1 15.9 17 93
woman 0.50 0.55 0.51 0.50 0 1
married 0.77 0.53 0.70 0.46 0 1
10 years schooling 0.48 0.34 0.44 0.50 0 1
13 years schooling 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.35 0 1
master craftsman 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.27 0 1
college 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.39 0 1
university 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.30 0 1
returns < 200 Mark 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.42 0 1
returns < 500 Mark 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.43 0 1
returns < 1,000 Mark 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.33 0 1
returns > 1,000 Mark 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.24 0 1
Hhold income/10,000 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.03 0.51
partner no job 0.09 0.16 0.11 0.32 0 1
partner income di®./1,000 0.39 0.26 0.35 0.43 0 3.63
retired 0.10 0.38 0.17 0.38 0 1
self-employed 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.15 0 1
civil servant 0.31 0.19 0.27 0.45 0 1
owns house 0.30 0.24 0.29 0.45 0 1
owns weekend house 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.36 0 1
no car 0.36 0.56 0.42 0.49 0 1
motorbike 0.42 0.23 0.37 0.48 0 1
children 0.54 0.28 0.47 0.50 0 1
one child 0.25 0.14 0.22 0.42 0 1
two children 0.24 0.12 0.20 0.40 0 1
three children + 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.20 0 1
family very important 0.89 0.74 0.85 0.36 0 1
unsatis¯ed social bene¯ts 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.50 0 1
security consciousness 8.83 8.75 8.81 1.83 0 10
Health satisfaction 6.80 6.25 6.65 2.64 0 10
classical concerts, theatre 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.32 0 1
pop concerts, movies, discos 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.36 0 1
active sports 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.35 0 1
meet friends, neighbors 0.58 0.66 0.64 0.48 0 1
help friends, neighbors 0.40 0.49 0.46 0.50 0 1
attend church services 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.28 0 1
N 1487 562 2049
Note: The sample is the 1990 GSOEP for East Germany. Demographic variables
refer to the household head.
34Table 7: Bequest motives - average marginal e®ects
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
only <65
age/10 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.048
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.069)
(age/10)2 -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
woman D 0.041** 0.041** 0.037* 0.045** 0.031
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
married D 0.024 0.025 0.013 0.025 0.010
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
10 years schooling D -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
13 years schooling D -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.007 -0.007
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
master craftsman D 0.034 0.034 0.027 0.036 -0.003
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040)
college D -0.046* -0.046* -0.049* -0.042 -0.041
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
university D -0.101** -0.100** -0.095* -0.096* -0.088*
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051)
returns < 200 Mark D 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.012
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
returns < 500 Mark D 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.017
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
returns < 500 Mark D 0.070** 0.069** 0.071** 0.072** 0.063**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
returns > 1,000 Mark D -0.075 -0.075* -0.078* -0.069 -0.099**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050)
Hhold income/10,000 D 2.102*** 2.106*** 1.776*** 2.115*** 2.054***
(0.532) (0.533) (0.539) (0.530) (0.564)
(Hhold income/10,000)2 -3.919*** -3.927*** -3.119** -3.938*** -3.613***
(1.249) (1.250) (1.268) (1.241) (1.299)
partner no job -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 0.005
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.039)
partner income di®./1000 D 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
retired -0.045 -0.044 -0.053 -0.053 0.036
(0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.056)
self-employed D 0.023 0.023 0.018 0.028 0.026
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.056)
civil servant D 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.017
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
35. . . Table 7 continued . . .
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
only <65
owns house D 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.024
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
owns weekend house D 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.037
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
no car D 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.007
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
motorbike D 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.056***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
children D 0.070*** 0.063** 0.070*** 0.071***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
one child D 0.080***
(0.029)
two children D 0.068**
(0.032)
three children + D 0.071
(0.054)
family very important D 0.070** 0.077**
(0.028) (0.033)
unsatis¯ed social bene¯ts D -0.006 0.006
(0.018) (0.019)
security conscious 0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
health satisfaction -0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
classical concerts, theatre D -0.038
(0.031)
pop concerts, movies, discos D 0.017
(0.028)
active sports D -0.036
(0.028)
meet friends, neighbors D 0.025
(0.020)
help friends, neighbors D 0.018
(0.019)
attend church services D -0.023
(0.035)
N 2,049 2,049 2,024 2,049 1,715
Pseudo-R2 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.148 0.064
Â2 306.4 306.3 300.1 307.7 107.0
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 2,108.8 2,112.7 2,082.5 2,114.2 1,689.6
BIC 2,249.5 2,264.6 2,245.2 2,288.6 1,847.6
D indicates dummy variables. Average marginal e®ects are reported. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate signi¯cance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level.
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